Cooperative federations are usually characterized by the existence of bailout guarantees and intergovernmental transfer schemes. This paper explores whether such Therefore, a test for strategic interactions in subnational borrowing can be used to infer whether a cooperative federation like Germany is susceptible to soft budget constraints. The results suggest that state borrowing in Germany exhibited horizontal but not vertical interactions during the time-frame of the analysis. This indicates (i) that German States faced soft budget constraints and (ii) that they were more concerned about the likelihood of a bailout than about its volume.
Introduction
The fiscal federalism literature distinguishes two types of federations. Countries where subnational governments possess substantial tax autonomy, where revenues are not shared, and little fiscal equalization takes place are called competitive federations. In cooperative federations, on the other hand, subnational tax autonomy tends to be low, revenues are usually shared, considerable fiscal equalization takes place, and im-or explicit bailout guarantees are often given (Schaltegger and Feld, 2009 ).
These two types of federations lead to different incentives for policy makers. Consequently, they will have different implications for macroeconomic and fiscal outcomes (Weingast, 2009) . One criticism leveled against cooperative systems of federalism in recent years is that they are much more susceptible to subnational over-borrowing. This assertion is primarily founded on case studies which show that cooperative federations such as Argentina (Dillinger and Webb, 1999) , Brazil (Samuels, 2003) , and Germany (Seitz, 1999) have experienced considerably more problems with subnational debt than competitive federations like Switzerland (Feld and Kirchgässner, 2007) and the United States (Inman, 2003) .
These case studies suggest that lower-level jurisdictions in cooperative federations have an incentive to over-borrow because of soft budget constraints. In federal fiscal relations, soft budget constraints can emerge if subnational governments expect that some of the costs of their borrowing will eventually be paid for by the federal government. It has been argued in the literature that federal governments in cooperative federations are more likely to bail out an indebted jurisdiction than those in competitive federations (Blankart and Klaiber, 2006) . Indeed, it is a reasonable conjecture that once schools and police departments have to be closed due to subnational over-borrowing, calls for a federal intervention will be more pronounced in cooperative than in competitive federations because of differing expectations regarding the responsibilities of the federation. In particular, the existence of an extensive fiscal equalization scheme signals to all states that the federation has the institutional means and the political will to bail out an indebted jurisdiction.
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One methodological approach put forward in the literature to test whether the soft budget constraints problem and thus subnational over-borrowing is more prevalent in cooperative federations than in competitive ones is to simply regress a measure for the indebtedness of the public sector on a measure for the importance of contemporaneous intergovernmental transfers. The underlying idea behind this approach is that the importance of intergovernmental transfers is a reasonable proxy for the competitiveness of a federation. In general, studies using this approach, e. g. De Mello (2000) , Rodden (2002) , and Baskaran (2010) , find that cooperative federations do not systematically borrow more than competitive ones.
However, one problem with the methodological approach advanced in these studies is that they do not test the soft budget constraints argument properly. According to the theoretical literature on soft budget constraints, the reason for their emergence are expected future transfers that are paid to alleviate the costs associated with a large debt burden, not contemporaneous transfers. Therefore, contemporaneous transfers are at best only an imperfect proxy for bailout expectations, and at worst an incorrect one.
Due to this methodological problem, a second strand of the empirical literature focuses on individual countries and explores whether specific institutional features within a country lead to soft budget constraints.
2 In this paper, I follow this strand of the literature and 1 By now, there are also several theoretical contributions suggesting that bailout guarantees and the possibility of discretionary transfers lead to fiscal distortions. See for example Wildasin (1997) , Qian and Roland (1998) , Goodspeed (2002) , Doi and Ihori (2006) , Akai and Sato (2008) , Crivelli and Staal (2008) , and Breuillé and Vigneault (2010) .
2 For example, Pettersson-Lidbom and Dahlberg (2005) argue that for local communities in Sweden, past bailouts provide information regarding the likelihood of future bailouts. Using an instrumental variable approach, they find that bailout expectations have a strong causal effect on local debt. Rodden (2000) studies state borrowing in Germany. He argues that the structure of fiscal equalization in Germany induces bailout expectations in the states that are net-recipients during horizontal equalization, but not in the states that are net-payers. He then shows that net-recipient states are slower in adjusting their fiscal policies to adverse fiscal shocks than net-paying states. Based on this finding, he concludes that bailout explore whether specific features of the fiscal constitution prevailing in the Federal Republic of Germany have led to subnational soft budget constraints during the 1975-2005 period.
The methodology used in this paper is based on the premise that subnational borrowing in cooperative federations should be characterized by vertical and horizontal strategic interactions if subnational governments face soft budget constraints. In other words, if a state expects that it will receive a bailout once it faces a severe fiscal crisis, then its contemporaneous borrowing should react systematically to the borrowing of the federal government (vertical interactions) and/or to the borrowing of other member states of the federation (horizontal interactions).
Why should bailout guarantees lead to vertical strategic interactions in subnational borrowing? If the federal government cannot commit to a no-bailout policy, every subnational government has an incentive to increase borrowing. The magnitude of this incentive, however, will depend on the expected amount of resources the federal government will have at its disposal when a bailout becomes necessary. If there is reason to suspect that the federal government will have fewer resources in the future because of its own borrowing, subnational incentives to over-borrow will be, ceteris paribus, less pronounced, and vice versa.
Horizontal strategic interactions may emerge for two reasons. First, higher transfers to other subnational jurisdictions imply lower transfers for one's own jurisdiction as long as federal resources are finite. This means that if other jurisdictions over-borrow, the available resources for a bailout for one's own jurisdiction will be reduced. Second, the decision of whether or not to grant a bailout to a given subnational jurisdiction will be made not only based on its own debt burden but also based on that in other subnational jurisdictions.
Usually, a jurisdiction has to prove that it faces extraordinary fiscal difficulties before it will receive a bailout. If all jurisdictions exhibit a high debt burden, it is difficult for any expectations lead to less sound fiscal policies. However, one problematic feature of his study is that the methodology relies on the assumption that only net-recipient states operate under soft budget constraints.
individual jurisdiction to argue that it is extraordinarily needy. Hence, each subnational government has to take the borrowing in other jurisdictions into account when optimally determining its own borrowing policy.
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For these reasons, it can be expected that subnational borrowing in cooperative federations will be characterized by vertical and horizontal interactions if subnational governments operate under soft budget constraints. Anecdotal evidence suggests that this line of reasoning applies to Germany, an archetypical cooperative federation. Decisions regarding whether or not a state should receive a federal bailout have been made in Germany by the federal constitutional court. Relying on a number of constitutional stipulations (in particular, Art. 72 , Art. 106, and Art. 107) which demand that equal living conditions have to be guaranteed throughout the federation, the court granted two states, Saarland and Bremen, a bailout in 1992.
4 In determining whether the debt levels in Bremen and
Saarland necessitate a federal bailout, the constitutional court compared the debt to GDP ratio and the fiscal burden caused by the interest payments in these two states with that in all other German states.
This ruling by the constitutional court hence made explicit what subnational policy makers in Germany have in all likelihood already known implicitly: that the probability of a state receiving a bailout depends not only on its own borrowing, but also on the borrowing of all other states. The ruling also underscored that the likelihood of another state receiving a bailout depends on any given state's borrowing insofar as it affects the average debt burden of the subnational tier. Moreover, it implicitly affirmed that the fiscal situation of the federal government will affect decisions regarding subnational bailouts.
It is consequently a reasonable conjecture that the borrowing polices of the constituent 3 Note that the theoretical models developed by Wildasin (1997) , Goodspeed (2002) , Breuillé and Vigneault (2010) , and Akai and Sato (2008) also suggest that bailout expectations will lead to vertical and horizontal strategic interactions in fiscal policy.
4 Even though the constitutional court declined to provide a bailout to the state of Berlin in 2006, it did so on the grounds that Berlin was not "indebted enough" to require a bailout. In fact, it reaffirmed in this ruling that a subnational debt burden that is "too high" should lead to a bailout (Häde, 2007) . members of the German federation, i. e. the states and the federal government, are interdependent and will exhibit strategic interactions if some or all states operate under soft budget constraints.
In this paper, therefore, I empirically study whether the borrowing in a given German State reacts to the borrowing of other member states of the federation and/or to the borrowing of the federal government in order to establish whether subnational governments in Germany operate under soft budget constraints. More specifically, I estimate linear models where the dependent variable is the deficit to GDP ratio of state i in year t and the main independent variables are (i) the weighted average 5 deficit to GDP ratio of the "other" states in the federation and (ii) the deficit to GDP ratio of the federal government.
Since OLS does not produce consistent estimates in models with such fiscal policy interactions, I rely on the instrumental variable approach to identify the effect of the other states' weighted average deficit to GDP ratio and the federal government's deficit to GDP ratio on the deficit to GDP ratio of a given state i. Unfortunately, I am not aware of any natural-experiment type mechanism that induces truly exogenous variation in the endogenous variables. Therefore, I use a set of instruments for which I argue below that they are likely to be robust to certain sources of endogeneity. However, since I cannot rule out all possible sources of endogeneity ex-ante, I also present a set of robustness checks in order
to explore to what extent the results are driven by each of the instruments.
I use the other states' lagged weighted average deficit to GDP ratio and their weighted average contemporaneous population growth as instruments for their weighted average deficit to GDP ratio. As instruments for the deficit to GDP ratio of the federal government, I use a dummy variable indicating federal election years and a dummy variable indicating the ideology of the federal government.
5 I consider four different weighting schemes. See section 3.2 for more details.
The lagged and contemporaneous deficits of other states will be related if there is some persistence in deficits. The reason to expect a strong relationship between the other states' population growth and their deficits is that population size is the most important determinant of the amount of equalization transfers a state receives during horizontal and vertical equalization in Germany. An increase in population size will therefore lead to higher revenues and consequently to smaller deficits in any given state. A relationship between federal deficits and federal election years can emerge if the federal government adjusts deficits in view of federal elections. Similarly, it is also a reasonable conjecture that there are ideological differences in the borrowing policies of the federal government.
6
In addition to being strongly related to the endogenous variables, the instruments should also be uncorrelated with the error term in the second stage regressions in order to produce reliable estimates. One reason to suspect such a correlation in the current context is reverse causality between the deficit of a state i and the population growth in other states. Such reverse causality may emerge if inhabitants migrate in view of state deficits. However, the execution of a decision to migrate, even if it is based on deficits, will take time. Therefore, even though this instrument may not be strictly exogenous, it appears to be feasible to treat it as pre-determined. Nonetheless, I present in section 4.3 a robustness check where the baseline models are re-estimated after omitting the other states' weighted average 6 I estimate least squares dummy variable (LSDV) and Anderson-Hsiao models in the empirical section. In the first stage regressions for the LSDV models, the other states' lagged weighted average deficit to GDP ratio generally displays, as expected, a significantly positive correlation with their contemporaneous weighted average deficit to GDP ratio. The weighted average of the other states' population growth is generally significantly and negatively correlated with their weighted average deficit to GDP ratio, which is expected as well. I also find in the first stage regressions for the LSDV models that right-wing federal governments have borrowed significantly more than left-wing federal governments and that federal deficits have been significantly lower in election years. In the Anderson-Hsiao models, I use both first differences and further lags of the other states' lagged weighted average deficit to GDP ratio and weighted average population growth to instrument the first differences of their contemporaneous weighted average deficit to GDP ratio. These instruments are significantly related to the endogenous variable, but because both first differences and lags of the instruments are simultaneously included, the signs of the coefficients cannot be as easily interpreted as for the LSDV models. For the first difference of the federal deficit to GDP ratio, I use first differences of the federal ideology and election dummies as instruments in the Anderson-Hsiao models. For these instruments, the first stage regressions in the Anderson-Hsiao models are similar to those in the LSDV models. This kind of reverse-causality is implausible for the lagged weighted average deficit to GDP ratio of other states since there cannot be an effect of the deficit of state i in period t on the deficits of other states in t-1. However, it is possible that this variable has a direct effect on the deficit of a state i if states react with some lag to each others' borrowing. Since Reversed causality between state deficits and the federal election and ideology dummies is implausible as well because the deficit of any particular state i is unlikely to have an effect on the timing or on the outcome of federal elections. However, these variables may have a direct effect on state i's deficits if some states receive fiscal benefits from a politically aligned federal government or if they adjust their fiscal policy in view of federal elections.
Consequently, in line with the procedure for the other states' lagged weighted average deficit to GDP ratio, I explore the robustness of the results to including these instruments in the second stage regressions in section 4.3.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In section 2, I briefly discuss the federal system and the evolution of subnational debt in Germany. In section 3, I derive the empirical specification for testing whether strategic interactions in subnational borrowing exist and describe the data. In section 4, I report the results. They suggest the presence of positive horizontal strategic interactions. However, while this finding is consistent with the existence of soft budget constraints, subnational borrowing in Germany might exhibit horizontal strategic interactions for other reasons than soft budget constraints. In particular, if voters use the borrowing in other states as yardstick to evaluate the performance of their own state governments, every state government might have an incentive to react strategically to other states' borrowing, a mechanism that is referred to as yardstick competition (Salmon, 1987) . Thus, section 5 explores whether the horizontal strategic interactions can be explained by yardstick competition or whether soft budget constraints are indeed the most likely explanation. Section 6 concludes with a discussion of the findings.
Fiscal federalism in Germany
The Federal Republic of Germany is founded on strong federalist principles. It consists of three tiers of government: federal (Bund), state (Länder), and local (Gemeinden). The localities, however, are with respect to fiscal matters subordinate to the states. The important protagonists for the purposes of this paper are therefore the federal and state governments.
Until the unification of West-Germany with the former GDR in October 1990, the German federation consisted of eleven states.
7 Unification took the form of an admittance of five recreated states on the territory of the former GDR into the federation. Simultaneously, West-and East-Berlin were merged into a single city-state. The number of states hence increased to sixteen. Three of these are city-states, comprising only one city: Berlin, Bremen, and Hamburg.
The federal tier has more legislative power in Germany than in the US or Canada (Watts and Hobson, 2000) . However, the states have significant influence on federal legislation. All federal laws that have financial consequences for the states need majority support in the Bundesrat, i. e. the second chamber of parliament where state governments are organized. For all other legislation, the Bundesrat has a suspensive veto.
The city-state of West-Berlin had a special position since the western allies were formally responsible for its administration. However, it was de facto the eleventh state of West-Germany.
8 The Bundesrat consists of representatives of the state governments, usually the first minister and other senior state ministers. The number of votes allocated to each state depends positively on the size of the population. Votes are, however, not proportional to population size. Less populous states have a disproportionately large share of votes. The number of votes can vary over time, depending on the development of the population.
Subnational expenditures are largely financed through tax revenues, transfers, and debt.
In general, state governments are free to borrow. There is a nominal rule-based borrowing restriction for the federal and state tier, but it has been widely criticized as ineffective.
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That it has indeed not prevented the persistent growth of subnational debt, can be inferred from figure 1 where the debt to GDP ratio of the subnational tier is plotted over time.
This figure reveals that the debt to GDP ratio of the subnational tier has increased from just over 10% to around 25% between 1975 and 2005. 
Empirical Analysis
As argued in the introduction, a test for strategic interactions in borrowing can be used to infer whether a cooperative federation is characterized by soft budget constraints. In general, studies exploring fiscal interactions tend to focus on taxes (Devereux et al., 2008; Edmark and Agren, 2008) and expenditures (Case et al., 1993; Baicker, 2005) ; studies exploring fiscal interactions in borrowing policies are rarer. One exception is Landon and Smith (2000) who study for Canada how debt accumulation by the central and provincial governments affects the creditworthiness of other federation members.
Empirical model
The following model is estimated to explore the existence of vertical and horizontal strategic interactions in subnational borrowing:
In this model, Deficit i,t is the deficit to GDP ratio of state i in year t, W t × Deficit i,t = j =i w j,t Deficit j,t is the weighted average of the other states' deficit to GDP ratio in year t, Deficit f ed t is the federal deficit to GDP ratio, Deficit i,t−1 is the lagged deficit to GDP ratio of state i, x i,t is a vector of control variables as described further below and listed in table 1, γ i are cross-section fixed effects, and Trend is a time-trend.
The existence of horizontal and vertical interactions is tested with the coefficient estimates for α and β. If the estimate for α is significantly different from 0, it can be concluded that horizontal strategic interactions in state borrowing exist. Similarly, finding that the estimate for β is significantly different from 0 indicates the presence of vertical strategic interactions.
What are the expected signs of the estimates for α and β? If soft budget constraints exist, the direction of the vertical interactions should be negative. The reason is that if the federal government borrows more in a given year, the amount of federal resources that will be available in the future for a bailout of a state will be lower. Everything else equal, this reduction in expected resources that are available for a bailout should incentivize a state i to reduce its own borrowing.
The direction of the horizontal interactions is more difficult to predict. On the one hand, an increase in the borrowing of other states should incentivize any given state i to increase its own borrowing because by doing so it can retain or increase its chances for a bailout and/or reduce the likelihood that other states will get one. On the other hand, a rise in the debt level of other states means that these states increase, ceteris paribus, their claim on limited bailout resources. Hence, the expected amount of bailout resources available to state i will be lower, thereby incentivizing it to reduce its own borrowing. Because of these two countervailing effects, the sign of the estimate for α is difficult to predict ex-ante.
Estimating model 1 involves solving two problems (Brueckner, 2003) . First, the weight w j,t that state j has in the reaction function of state i in year t has to be determined. As these weights cannot be estimated, they have to be imposed ex-ante. The usual procedure is therefore to experiment with different weighting schemes (see the next section).
The second problem is that estimating model 1 with OLS or an analogous estimator produces inconsistent estimates because the deficits in different states and at the federal level are, by definition, determined simultaneously if fiscal interactions exist. As indicated in the introduction, I rely on the instrumental variables approach to solve this problem. I use the weighted average of the other states' lagged deficit to GDP ratio and the weighted average of the other states' population growth as instruments for the weighted average of the other states' contemporaneous deficit to GDP ratio, W t × Deficit i,t . For the federal deficit to GDP ratio, Deficit f ed t , I use a federal election year dummy and a dummy indicating the ideology of the federal government. The federal election year dummy assumes the value 1 in years with a federal election, and else 0. The federal ideology dummy assumes the value 1 in years with a conservative federal government (a federal government that is led by the CDU-party), and else 0.
Weights
The weights of the other states in model 1 have to be chosen ex-ante. By convention, these weights have the property that, first, state i itself receives a weight of 0 and, second, that the weights of all other states w j,t sum to 1 (i. e. they are row-normalized).
I use four different weighting schemes. First, I give all other states the same weight.
This weighting scheme will be referred to as AVG. The weights are recalculated every year, hence the weight of state j in i's reaction function is given by:
where I k,t is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 when state k exists in year t and else 0. This implies that the weights of the eleven West-German States remain constant at 1/10 until 1991, the year after unification, and then fall to 1/15 as five new states were created after unification. The newly formed East-German States also receive a weight of 1/15 from 1991 onward in this weighting scheme.
Second, I assign weights to each of the other states according to their population sizes.
States with a larger population receive a relatively larger weight:
This weighting scheme is referred to as POP. The idea behind this weighting scheme is that the borrowing policy of a big state will impact the borrowing policy of a state i more than that of a small state. Because the weights are recalculated every year, they reflect any changes in population sizes from year to year. The population in East-Germany is incorporated in this weighting scheme from 1991 onwards.
Third, I assign weights to the other states according to their position during horizontal equalization. If state i is a net-recipient state in year t, all other net-recipient states in year t are considered to affect state i's borrowing and receive the same positive weight, whereas the net-paying states will be considered as irrelevant for its borrowing and receive a weight of 0. Conversely, if state i is a net-paying state in t, all other net-paying states in this year receive a positive weight, whereas all net-recipient states receive a weight of 0.
More formally:
if i and j have the same position during horizontal equalization 0 else.
Here, I k is an indicator variable that is 1 when i and k have the same position during horizontal equalization and 0 else. This weighting scheme is referred to as LFA I (the acronym LFA stands for "Länderfinanzausgleich"). It is based on the premise that states are particularly concerned with the borrowing policy of fiscally similar states. For example, a net-recipient state might feel compelled to increase its deficits if another net-recipient state incurs a large deficit in order to retain its chances for a federal bailout, but it may be indifferent to the fiscal policy of a net-paying state because it does not perceive it as a competitor in the bailout game.
Fourth, I again assign weights to the other states according to their position during horizontal equalization, but in the opposite fashion to the LFA I weights. If state i is a net-recipient state in year t, the borrowing of all other net-recipient states in year t is considered to be unrelated to state i's borrowing in this weighting scheme. These states therefore receive a weight of 0. The borrowing policy in all net-paying states, on the other hand, is assumed to affect the borrowing of state i. These states consequently receive the same positive weight. Conversely, if state i is a net-paying state in t, all other net-paying states in this year receive a weight of 0, whereas all net-recipient states receive the same positive weight. More formally: 
Here, I k is an indicator variable that is 1 when i and k have different positions during horizontal equalization and 0 else. This weighting scheme is referred to as LFA II. It is based on the premise that net-paying states are particularly concerned with the borrowing policy of net-recipient states and vice versa. For example, by incurring higher deficits themselves (or by saving less), net-paying states can lower the likelihood that net-recipient states receive bailouts.
Because the LFA I and LFA II weights are recalculated every year, they reflect any changes in the position of a state during horizontal equalization from one year to another. This is particularly relevant for Bavaria and North Rhine-Westphalia. Bavaria was always a net-recipient until 1986, then held either a neutral position or was a net-payer until 1992.
In 1992, it was for the last time in the sample period a net-recipient, thereafter it was always a net-payer. North Rhine-Westphalia has usually assumed a net-paying or neutral position, but received some minor amounts from horizontal equalization in the eighties and early nineties. I therefore choose the LFA I and LFA II weights accordingly. This means for the LFA I weights that in years where Bavaria and North Rhine-Westphalia were net-recipients, I assign to them a positive weight if state i is a net-recipient and else 0. In years where they were net-payers, I assign to them a positive weight when state i is a net-payer and else 0. I apply the opposite procedure for the LFA II weights.
In years where a state assumed a neutral position (i. e. neither payed nor received anything during horizontal equalization), I drop it from the sample in the regressions with the LFA weights. This effectively means that such a state receives a weight of 0 in the reaction function of the other states, i. e. its deficits are assumed to be unrelated to the deficits of other states in these years. For this reason, the number of observations in the regressions with the LFA weights is slightly smaller than in those with the AVG and POP weights. 
Data
The dependent variable in all regressions is the deficit to GDP ratio of state i. It is constructed by dividing the absolute nominal change (i. e. the first difference) in the 12 Only few states have held a neutral position during the 1975 period: Bavaria in 1987 and 1988 , Hamburg in 1988 and 1992 North Rhine-Westphalia in 1979 , 1981 , 1982 , 1983 , 1984 , and 1986 and Schleswig-Holstein in 1998 . Finally, Berlin and the East-German States were not part of the horizontal equalization scheme before 1995, instead they received either grants from the federal government or from special funds. These observations, too, are dropped in the LFA regressions.
capital market debt (i. e. the long-term obligations) of a state and its localities with the nominal state GDP.
The control variables of interest are: i) the weighted average of the other states' deficit to GDP ratio and ii) the federal deficit to GDP ratio. As with the states' deficit to GDP ratio, the one for the federal government is constructed by dividing the absolute change in the capital market debt of the federal government by the nominal GDP of the whole federation.
The debt to GDP ratio of a state i at the beginning of period t is included as a control variable to capture the effect of the debt burden on a state's borrowing policy.
The revenue to GDP ratio is included to control for the resources a state has available.
Controlling for this ratio is important in the current context because otherwise it would be difficult to distinguish between fiscal interactions due to deliberate choices by state governments and a mere correlation of fiscal balances because of the nature of fiscal equalization in Germany. For example, the equalization system ensures that a negative revenue shock in one single state leads to a reduction in revenues in all other states as well, which might then result in a non-deliberate increase in borrowing in all states. However, by including a state's revenue to GDP ratio in the model, it is possible to control for this alternative explanation for a uniform evolution of subnational fiscal balances.
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Population growth is included to capture congestion and/or scale effects on the budget.
The unemployment rate is included to control for business cycle effects. The share of the "young" (≤ 15 years) and the "old" (≥ 65 years) in the total population is included to capture the effect of the demographic structure of a state. Productivity growth is included to capture how the productivity of the economy affects deficits.
13 Note that revenues are largely predetermined from the perspective of a state because the fiscal constitution in Germany gives the states only minuscule tax autonomy and the tax sharing rules are fixed by federal law well before the determination of the deficit. Reverse causality is therefore unlikely. Nonetheless, the models reported below were re-estimated after including the states' revenue to GDP ratio in the set of endogenous variables and instrumenting it with its first lag. The results (available from the author) regarding the existence of horizontal and vertical interactions were essentially the same.
A dummy variable that is 1 after 1991 and 0 before is included to capture the effect of unification. A dummy indicating whether year t is an election year in state i is included to control for political business cycles. State i's number of votes in the second chamber of parliament, the Bundesrat, is included because states tend to trade their acceptance of certain legislation introduced by the federal government for larger federal transfers. Thus, these votes constitute an asset that can translate into higher revenues in the future. An increase in the number of votes might therefore induce a state to incur higher deficits.
A number of dummy variables indicating the ideology of the government are included.
During the time-frame of the analysis, German States have witnessed six different types of (coalition) governments. They are described in more detail in table 1. One of the ideology dummies has to be dropped in the regressions because of perfect collinearity. I drop the dummy indicating a sole CDU government. All estimates for the ideology variables should therefore be interpreted relative to the CDU dummy. Around 27% of the observations are characterized by sole CDU governments.
The interest rate on long-term government bonds is included to capture the costs of borrowing. This variable varies over time but not over the states. It is a reasonably good approximation of the states' borrowing costs given that their bonds tend to be rated as well as federal bonds. If a rating agency attaches different ratings to state bonds, the variance of these ratings is very small and only due to the speed with which the agency expects a federal bailout to be administered if a state should come to face unresolvable budgetary problems (Seitz, 1999; Rodden, 2005) .
The federal debt to GDP ratio at the beginning of period t is included to capture the effect of the absolute fiscal position of the federal government: if the federal government has a large debt burden, subnational governments might think it prudent to incur lower deficits.
I also include in all regressions cross-section fixed effects and a time-trend. The fixed effects are included to control for unobserved heterogeneity across states. The time trend is included instead of time dummies because the effect of time dummies cannot be separately identified from that of the weighted average deficit to GDP ratio of the other states' when uniform weights are used (Devereux et al., 2008) . Moreover, federal level variables cannot be included as well when time dummies are present because of perfect multicollinearity.
That is, it would be impossible to study vertical strategic interactions.
Estimation and results
It is well known that estimating a model that includes a lagged dependent variable and fixed effects with the least squares dummy variable (LSDV) estimator leads to the Nickell-Bias because the within-transformed lagged dependent variable is correlated with the transformed error term (Nickell, 1981) .
14 However, the bias approaches 0 when the timedimension becomes large, i. e. the LSDV estimator is consistent for large T. The question is then whether the time-dimension of the data at hand, which ranges from 1975 to 2005, can be considered as large enough to apply the LSDV estimator. Using simulations, Judson and Owen (1999) report that with a time-dimension of 30 or higher, the LSDV estimator performs well compared to the alternatives. Given that my dataset is at this margin, I estimate model 1 first with the LSDV estimator, but also use thereafter in section 4.2 the Anderson-Hsiao estimator.
14 There are several estimators available to estimate a fixed effects model. One common alternative is the LSDV estimator. When there are no endogenous variables, the LSDV estimator functions as follows. First, the fixed effects are explicitly included in the regression. Then the model is estimated with OLS. Other popular alternatives are the within-and first-difference estimators. (It can be shown that the LSDV and within-estimator are equivalent, but a degrees of freedom correction has to be applied to the standard errors when the within-estimator is used). However, all three estimators lead to biased estimates when a lagged dependent variable is included in the model. To deal with this problem, a number of dynamic panel data estimators, including the Anderson-Hsiao estimator, have been developed. Finally, the presence of autocorrelation is tested with a procedure suggested by Devereux et al. (2008) . After estimating a model, the residuals are predicted. Then, the model is reestimated after including the first lag of the residuals as an additional control variable. If this variable turns out to be significant, it is concluded that there is evidence for autocorrelation. In the regression tables further below, the row entitled autocorrelation test reports the p-value of the lagged residuals in the appended regressions.
LSDV estimations
The results of estimating model 1 with the LSDV estimator while using the two stage least squares (2SLS) approach to instrument the endogenous variables are reported in table 2.
Four different regression results are reported. They are entitled according to the weighting scheme that is used, i. e. AVG, POP, LFA I, and LFA II.
The autocorrelation tests reported at the bottom of the table 2 provide evidence for autocorrelation in at least three regressions. In addition, there is also evidence for heteroscedasticity (test results not reported). All hypothesis tests are therefore based on heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard errors.
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The weak identification test statistic is over 10 in all regressions. The Hansen-J test performs well in the LFA I and LFA II regressions, in contrast to its performance in the 15 Inspection of the full results (available from the author) for the appended regressions shows that negative and not positive autocorrelation is found in these models. Not adjusting the standard errors for autocorrelation leads to essentially the same results.
AVG and POP regressions. Overall, the Hansen-J tests suggests that the LFA I and LFA II results are more reliable than the AVG and POP results for this set of regressions.
The estimate for α, the effect of the other states' weighted average deficit to GDP ratio on state i's deficit to GDP ratio, is positive in all but the AVG regression. It is also significant at least at the ten percent level in the LFA I and LFA II regressions. Since the results from the LFA I and LFA II regressions are more reliable than those from the AVG and POP regressions according to the Hansen-J test, I conclude based on this set of results that there is evidence for horizontal strategic interactions in subnational borrowing.
The estimates for β, the effect of the federal deficit to GDP ratio, is significantly negative for the POP regression, but insignificant for all other weighting schemes. Since the POP regression is unreliable according to the Hansen-J test, I conclude that there is no consistent evidence for the presence of vertical strategic interactions.
Overall, these results suggest that the borrowing behavior of German States exhibited horizontal strategic interactions during the sample period. The numerical value of the estimated coefficients in the LFA I and LFA II regressions is around 0.47. These estimates are large, but not implausible. In particular, they do not suggest explosive behavior.
Taking α = 0.47, it can be shown for uniform weights that an exogenous increase in the deficit to GDP ratio of 1 percentage point in state i leads, after all feedback effects, to a final increase of 1.027 percentage points in state i's deficit to GDP ratio and to an increase of 0.057 percentage points in each of the other 15 states. Thus, the aggregated subnational deficit to GDP ratio rises by 1.882 percentage points due to an exogenous increase in the deficit to GDP ratio of 1 percentage point in a state i.
Anderson-Hsiao estimations
As stated further above, one problem when estimating a dynamic model with fixed effects is that the LSDV estimator is inconsistent for small T. Therefore, alternative estimation methods have been developed to estimate such models consistently if T is small. According to the simulations in Judson and Owen (1999) , the best alternative in the current context is the Anderson-Hsiao estimator.
This estimator can be illustrated in a nutshell as follows (Roodman, 2008) . Consider the following dynamic model with a lagged dependent variable:
where y i,t−1 is the lagged dependent variable, the x i is a vector of the remaining control variables that can be endogenous or exogenous, and the ν i are cross-section fixed effects.
The Anderson-Hsiao estimator starts out by applying the first difference transformation to model 6:
If model 6 were a simple static fixed effects specification, model 7 could be consistently estimated with OLS (or with 2SLS if some of the variables in the x-vector are endogenous).
However, since the first-difference of the lagged dependent variable ∆y i,t−1 and the firstdifference of the idiosyncratic error ∆ǫ it are correlated, OLS would be inconsistent. Thus, the first difference of the lagged dependent variable has to be instrumented. The variant of the Anderson-Hsiao estimator that I use in the following instruments the first difference of the lagged dependent variable ∆y i,t−1 with the second lag of the dependent variable y i,t−2 .
The results from estimating model 1 with this Anderson-Hsiao estimator are reported in table 3. In all regressions, I continue to use 2SLS. I instrument the first difference of the other states' weighted average deficit to GDP ratio and the first difference of the federal government's deficit to GDP ratio with the first differences and lags of the instruments already used in the LSDV regressions: (i) the first difference and the first lag of the other states' lagged weighted average deficit to GDP ratio (i. e. the second lag of the other states' weighted average deficit to GDP ratio), (ii) the first difference and the first lag of the other states' weighted average population growth, and (iii) the first differences of the federal election and ideology dummies.
The significance tests are based on heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard errors. I use autocorrelation robust standard errors since there is evidence for firstorder autocorrelation. As indicated by the second-order autocorrelation test at the bottom of table 3, there is no evidence for second-order autocorrelation, hence the second lag of the dependent variable is a valid instrument for the first difference.
The Hansen-J tests are insignificant for all except the LFA I regression. The weak identification test statistics are larger than 10 in all but the LFA II regression. Thus, while not perfect, the diagnostic tests do not suggest that the regressions suffer from common problems and, consequently, that they are reliable, at least to the extent to which they suggest similar conclusions. 
Robustness checks
The goal of this section is to explore the robustness of the results in the last sections to the possible invalidity of the instruments through further empirical tests. As argued in the introduction, each of the instruments might suffer from a specific source of endogeneity.
There might be reverse causality between the deficit of a state i and other states' population 
Soft budget constraints vs. yardstick competition
The estimates reported in the previous section indicate that the borrowing policy of German States displayed horizontal strategic interactions during the 1975-2005 period. Until now, it has been implicitly assumed that soft budget constraints are the cause for these interactions. This is indeed a likely explanation given the provisions in the German fiscal constitution. However, there is also an alternative explanation for the horizontal strategic interactions: that state governments engaged in yardstick competition (Salmon, 1987; Besley and Case, 1995) . Both explanations result in the same reduced form for the econometric model (Brueckner, 2003) . Therefore, it is not possible to conclusively determine on the basis of the estimates reported in the previous sections which of the two mechanisms is responsible for the horizontal strategic interactions.
In this section, therefore, I investigate this issue further. Since expectations cannot be measured, it is difficult to directly test to what extent bailout expectations and hence soft budget constraints drive strategic interactions. However, the yardstick competition explanation for strategic interactions can be tested based on the following argument: If strategic interactions are primarily driven by yardstick competition, the estimates for α should be i) significantly larger in election than in non-election years and ii) when the government is formed by conservative instead of left-wing parties. The reason to expect a larger effect in election years is that if a state government believes that its electorate uses the borrowing in other states as a yardstick for evaluating its own borrowing, the borrowing in other states will be particularly important when an election is imminent. The reason to expect a larger effect for conservative parties is that their constituency tends to be more critical of public borrowing. Hence, a conservative government can win favor with its voters by running a sounder fiscal policy than the other states in the federation. Likewise, it will disenchant its voters more than a left-wing government if it incurs higher deficits than other states.
To explore the election-based explanation for yardstick competition, I construct two new variables. One is constructed by interacting the weighted average of the other states' deficit to GDP ratio with a dummy variable that is 1 in election years and 0 else; the other is constructed by interacting the weighted average of the other states deficit to GDP ratio with a dummy that is 1 in non-election years and 0 else. These new variables thus separately incorporate the other states' deficits in election and non-election years. I also create a new set of instruments according to this procedure based on the old set. I then re-estimate model 1 with these variables such that a separate effect in election and non-election years is estimated.
To explore the validity of the ideology-based explanation for yardstick competition, I
again construct two new variables. One is constructed by interacting the weighted average of the other states' deficit to GDP ratio with a dummy variable that is 1 when the government is formed by the CDU alone or a CDU-FDP coalition (these two types of governments are usually considered to be conservative in Germany), and 0 else; the other is constructed by interacting the weighted average of the other states' deficit to GDP ratio with a dummy that is 1 when the government is formed by a left or centrist coalition, and 0 else. As for the election-based explanation, I also create a new set of instruments according to the same procedure, and then use these variables to re-estimate model 1.
For brevity, I only report the coefficient estimates for the weighted averages of the other states in table 6 (the full results are available from the author). Whether or not the estimates are larger for election years or, respectively, under a conservative government than in non-election years or, respectively, under a non-conservative government, can be tested with a t-test. Hence, I also report the p-value of a t-test on the equality of each of the two coefficients in these tables.
The t-tests show that the estimated coefficients for election and non-election years and those for conservative and non-conservative governments are not significantly different.
This indicates that yardstick competition is not the reason for the horizontal strategic interactions, thereby suggesting that soft budget constraints are the underlying cause for the horizontal interactions in subnational borrowing.
Conclusion
The goal of this paper was to explore whether the German States face soft budget con- on the wider "Föderalismusreform" (the reform of federalism in Germany). However, no agreement could be reached in these negotiations with respect to the intergovernmental transfer scheme and it was decided to continue with the current system at least until 2019.
Instead of a reform of the transfer scheme, a new borrowing rule was introduced for both the federal and state governments in the hope that it will be more effective in limiting the growth of debt at all tiers of government than the existing one. It will be interesting to observe how this so called "debt brake" will affect subnational soft budget constraints in the coming years. http://www.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/cirje/research/dp/2006/2006cf422.pdf. a The dependent variable is the first difference of the deficit to GDP ratio of state i, the independent variables of interest are the first difference of the weighted average of the other states' deficit to GDP ratio and the first difference of the federal government's deficit to GDP ratio; the various combinations of the party dummy variables (CDU, SPD, FDP, Green, PDS) indicate the ruling coalition in state i. b The instruments are: first difference of other states' weighted average population growth, first lag of other states' weighted average population growth, first difference of lagged weighted average of other states' deficit to GDP ratio, second lag of other states' weighted average deficit to GDP ratio, first difference of federal election year dummy, first difference of federal ideology dummy. c Column headings indicate the weighting scheme used in the respective estimation, i. e. AVG refers to uniform weights, POP to population weights, LFA I to the weighting scheme where fiscally similar states receive a positive weight, and LFA II to the weighting scheme where fiscally dissimilar states receive a positive weight. d Stars indicate significance levels at 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1%(***). e t-statistics in parentheses. f t-statistics and hypothesis tests based on heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard errors. g State fixed effects and time trend included in all models. h The Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic is used to test for weak identification. 
